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1 Introduction
Most of the existing empirical literature on new goods analyzes products that can
be claimed successful (see, e.g., Trajtenberg 1989, Hausman 1997 and Petrin
2002), at least in some respects. A stylized fact is, however, that the commerciali-
zation of product and service innovations is difficult and that the launches of new
goods frequently stumble and often fail (e.g. Scherer and Harhoff 2000). Quantita-
tive analyses of such failures are rare, but potentially important in furthering our
understanding of what can go wrong. The objective of this paper is to provide
such an analysis by studying the demand for and pricing of the first wireless Inter-
net services that were introduced in Europe at the end of the 1990s using an early
wireless Internet technology, the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP).1
Wireless Internet generated high expectations that materialized in the hun-
dreds of million euro of fees paid by mobile phone operators for the third-
generation (3G) European mobile phone licenses (Klemperer, 2002). The take-up
of the first (i.e., pre-3G) wireless services enabled by WAP was however not as
rapid as expected.2 Soon after its launch, some commentators announced WAP a
1 The wireless technologies currently in use are more advanced than WAP, which was introduced
in Europe in 1999. Shortly put, WAP was a first-generation solution to provide wireless services.
2 The European take-up of the WAP enabled services was slow for example compared to wireless
Internet in Japan, where i-mode, a service brand of NTT DoCoMo, took off rapidly after its intro-
duction in February 1999. At that time, the emphasis in the U.S. was perhaps more on laptops and
PDAs, but wireless internet services using mobile phones (e.g. AT&T’s mMode), on which
Europe and Asia initially concentrated, have recently been introduced also in the U.S..
1failure.3 While the current view and numbers clearly challenge the most critical
accounts,4 the question of why the take-up stumbled still remains. This question
has more than historical relevance as any new product launch, and the currently
ongoing launch of the third-generation mobile phone networks in particular, faces
these same problems.
The first step in addressing the puzzle of why the launch of a particular new
good or service fails to take off is to understand its demand: Is there no latent de-
mand (i.e., no demand at a zero-price) for it, or is the quantity demanded low be-
cause of prices? Conditional on the latent demand being there, the second step in
addressing the puzzle is to understand the impact of prices: Can sub-optimally
high prices explain the slow take-off? We follow these steps in our search for an
explanation for the slow take-up of the early European wireless services.
To understand whether there was insufficient demand for the new wireless
services at any price (no latent demand), we make use of consumer-level data
from a real world pricing experiment implemented in Fall 2001, and a structural
model of demand. Owing to the experiment, we observe the prices charged and
3 For example, the Nielsen Norman Group published a “WAP Usability Report” in December
2000. The report was based on a field study of WAP users in London and had a section titled
“WAP Doesn’t Work” in the executive summary. It concluded that “When users were asked
whether they were likely to use a WAP phone within one year, a resounding 70% answered no.
WAP is not ready for prime time yet, nor do users expect it to be usable any time soon”. See also
an  analyst  report  titled  “WAP  in  Europe:  Has  It  Missed  the  Boat?”  (by  Lonergan,  D.  from  the
Yankee Group, published in 2000). Ph.D. Jacob Nilsen, cited by the Business Week to be “one of
the world’s foremost experts in Web usability” and by Stuttgarter Zeitung, Germany “the world’s
leading expert on user-friendly design”, called WAP the “Wrong Approach to Portability” in his
October 1999 Alertbox -article (October 31, 1999, http://www.useit.com/alertbox/991031.html,
accessed 30 May 2004).
4 Views differ, but many see WAP as a constantly developing technology that has recently pro-
vided a bridge to newer generations of wireless technologies. A concrete example comes from
Digital Airways, who introduced in October 2003 a new WAP-compatible version of Wapaka
Web, its Java-based WAP simulator for the Web. The motivation was the take-off of WAP. The
company states: “We had to respond to a growing demand for a WAP 2.0 version of Wapaka” and
“Indeed, WAP is back.” (see http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/Sept2003/5891.htm, accessed 30 May
2004). Other estimates also speak for a kind of comeback of WAP: According to figures from the
Mobile  Data  Association  (the  U.K.),  the  number  of  WAP  page  impressions  viewed  in  the  UK
more than doubled during the nine months prior to May 2003. In Finland, usage has grown simi-
larly.
2the quantity demanded (i.e., the number and average length of connections) for a
panel of consumers both during four non-experimental and three experimental
two-week periods.  Prior to and after the experiment,  prices were at  their  normal
(equilibrium) levels. During the experiment, both the per-minute price and the
fixed connection fee were set to zero. Our structural model of demand decom-
poses the number of wireless connections into the number of needs that arise dur-
ing a two-week period, and the conditional probability of establishing a connec-
tion, given a need. We think of a need as being e.g. a need to check the weather
forecast before embarking on a long drive, and define a need as an instance where
a consumer would establish a connection of strictly positive length if the price of
doing  so  was  zero.  The  experiment  and  decomposition  allow  us  to  identify  the
magnitude of latent demand for wireless services and to study separately the effect
of pricing on the conditional probability of establishing a connection, given a
need, and on the length of the connection.
Our data come from a Finnish mobile phone operator.5 A  strength  of  the
data is that it combines individual characteristics and multiple observations per
individual over a short time period, allowing us to estimate the parameters of la-
tent demand and the conditional connection probability as functions of those char-
acteristics.6 We identify the parameters of our (econometric) model using varia-
tion that the experiment induces and estimate them using a flexible two-step m-
5 Finnish operators have some track record in pioneering new services: The first digital mobile
phone (GSM) call in the world was made in 1991 in Finland. Finland is one of the leaders in adop-
tion of mobile telephony in general, and of wireless services in particular (see, e.g., Hausman
2002, Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila 2003). Together with Japan, Finland was among the first coun-
tries where customers gained access to more advanced wireless services. At the time of the ex-
periment, already some 16% of mobile phones were equipped with the necessary technology to
utilize the kind of services we study. One might therefore expect that if anywhere, WAP enabled
wireless services should have taken off early in Finland.
6 Demand estimates for new services and goods are often wrought with empirical difficulties. Lack
of detailed data is a primary reason. Bajari and Benkard (2003) and Berry, Linton and Pakes
(2004) spell out some methodological difficulties.
3estimator (e.g. Newey 1994a). The demand estimations show that consumers had
demand for the first-generation wireless services, but it remained latent. The an-
nual average latent (satiation) demand was 300 connections per consumer. If any-
thing, this number appears consistent with the pre-launch hype and demand pro-
jections for the early wireless Internet. However, the average probability of estab-
lishing a connection, given a need, was only 10%. This low connection probabil-
ity is explained by pricing and surprisingly elastic demand.
As a second step, we examine whether it was optimal for the operator to set
prices that resulted in such a low connection probability. To this end, we back out
from our structural model the marginal costs implied by the actual prices – which,
given our assumption about the market power of the operator, give us an estimate
of the lower bound of marginal costs implied by the model. We compare these
estimates to the results of a structured survey of industry experts that provided us
alternative estimates of marginal costs. We find that even after making a series of
conservative assumptions, the marginal costs implied by the model are higher
than the marginal costs estimates of the industry experts, implying that the prices
were too high. The story that emerges is thus that sub-optimal prices reduced us-
age considerably.
We have also performed a number of counterfactual experiments. First, our
upper-bound estimate (using actual prices) for the average welfare gain per con-
sumer is 16 euros per year with a corresponding annual profit of 17 eu-
ros/customer, suggesting total welfare of 33 euros. This realized gain is lower than
the potential total welfare, estimated to be over 60 euros. Second, the optimal
two-part tariff, using the survey-based marginal costs estimates, implies that both
the connection fee and the per-minute price should have been lower. The increase
in profits (consumer welfare) from moving from actual to optimal prices is sensi-
4tive to the choice of demand specification, but could have been as much as 10.8
(12.5) euros per customer.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. In Section 2 we
discuss the technology, its relationship to the previous and forthcoming technolo-
gies, and the services available. In Section 3 we present our structural model, de-
rive our estimation equations, and discuss our identification strategy. In Section 4
we detail the data and its characteristics, and discuss both the demand and supply
side implications of our estimation results. We also report the industry expert es-
timates of marginal costs and discuss their implications for the optimality of the
actual prices. We provide an interpretation of our econometric findings and ex-
plore their robustness in Section 5. There we explore for example whether con-
sumer experimentation, advertising, shifting demand in time or specification
choices could explain the results. We close with a summary in Section 6.
2 The market, the technology and the experiment
The market we study is the service market enabled by the wireless Internet. The
services were accessed using a mobile phone with a “first-generation” micro
browser. The operator whose data we use launched its WAP-based wireless Inter-
net service in late 1999.7 At  the  time  of  the  experiment  in  2001,  the  operator’s
own service portfolio consisted of 67 services, ranging from news, sports results
7 WAP is a set of protocols that underlie one strand of the first technologies for the wireless Inter-
net. The WAP architecture is similar to that of the WWW-browsing architecture, with the excep-
tion that WAP requires an intermediate layer (“the WAP gateway”), which determines how the
wireless terminal and the Internet-architecture communicate. The devices and services available
during the experiment were based on WAP version 1.1. The wireless technologies in use today,
including later versions of WAP, are bridging the gap to the third and later generation technolo-
gies.
5and weather services to games, betting results and TV-listings.8 These services
were tailored for a wireless user. The users also had access to external Internet
sites.9
Pricing of the early wireless services was simple. A customer paid a fixed
monthly fee for her wireless plan. The monthly fee depended on the plan she sub-
scribed to, and no plan offered “free minutes”. Nor did the plans involve any leas-
ing of handsets, because a Finnish law prohibited the practice.10 There was no
additional monthly fee for using wireless Internet, but an additional data call fee
applied to all WAP connections. This fixed connection fee was 0.09 euros per
connection. The per-minute online charge was either 0.12 or 0.17 cents, depend-
ing on the wireless plan. Additional content charges also applied, but these de-
pended on the service provider.11
 A crude but illustrative counterpart of the services we study comes from
wireline Internet: 12 Using  the  early  WAP was  like  having  a  dial  up  Internet  ac-
8 Kakkori (2001) provides a complete account of the types of services that where available in May
2001 via the operator’s own wireless portal: They include search services, ticket order, travel in-
formation, weather forecast, certain financial services, health-related services, news, communica-
tions, cinema, humor, dating, phone personalization, music, games, radio listings, tips where to eat
and drink, TV listings, sports results, horoscope, betting results, and various operator services.
9 Because of the small screen sizes and limited input capabilities of the early mobile browsers, the
range and quality of services that the consumers in our sample were able to access are more lim-
ited than what are available today.
10 The prices of WAP handsets available in 2001 were, approximately, from 250 EUR (Ericsson
R320s) to 435 EUR (Nokia 6210). According to industry estimates, there were about 655000 WAP
compatible mobile phones in Finland at the time of the experiment. They accounted for about 16%
of the stock of digital mobile phones. The proportion of WAP-enabled phones was growing rap-
idly, however. It has been estimated that in 2001, nearly half of the new mobile phones were able
to utilize WAP.
11 It has been estimated that during 2001, about 60 % of the operator sponsored wireless services
had an additional contents charge (Kakkori, 2001). See Kakkori (2001, p. 24) for examples of
contents charges. Data on the distribution of the usage between the services with and without addi-
tional  content  charges  is  not  available  to  us.  We  know,  however,  that  during  the  experiment,  a
large majority (about 95%) of the per-two week charges for WAP-usage were zero (despite the
dramatically increased usage). This means that customers accessed mostly services with no addi-
tional charges.
12 Both WAP and the other leading wireless Internet technology of the time, i-mode in Japan,
transmitted the data at 9600 bits per second, which is quite slow. The display sizes were also quite
small. For example, one of the most often used terminals had a display with 96x60 pixels.
6cess. This meant that it took a while to download data intensive services and/or
applications. The wireless technologies currently in use are based on intermediate
technologies, often called “2.5G”. For the end-user, they are like a dedicated
Internet access13 that is often used for data transmission only and that sometimes
comes with enhanced quality (speed). Accessing wireless services enabled by the
next generation mobile networks (“3G”) is a bit like accessing the Internet using a
high-speed connection such as DSL or a cable modem.
The Finnish mobile phone operator whose data we use is one of the major
firms in the market. The experiment was conducted as an advertising campaign
for the new WAP enabled services, and consisted of lowering the per-minute-
price and the fixed connection fee to zero for six weeks in Fall 2001 for all cus-
tomers of the operator.14 The operator advertised the campaign in TV, radio, and
the major national and local newspapers both before and during the experiment.
We believe that all customers with a WAP enabled phone were aware of the cam-
paign taking place. After the campaign, the prices returned to their previous lev-
els.
3 The model and estimation strategy
The first  step  in  our  search  for  an  explanation  for  the  slow take-up  of  the  early
WAP enabled wireless services is to infer whether there was latent demand for
them. The second step is to understand the supply side.
13 This  is  like  using  Integrated  Services  Digital  Network,  known as  ISDN or  ISDL,  which  is  an
early version of Digital Subscriber Line, DSL.
14 One could argue that in order to get reasonable welfare estimates our data should include varia-
tion also up, not only down, from the actual prices. We agree with this in principle. It turns out,
however, that for reasonable values of marginal costs (see below), the actual prices in our data
were above (short-run) monopoly prices. We therefore think that our data contain information on
how customers behave with “high” and zero prices.
73.1 Step 1: Demand side analysis
The theoretical model of demand
We  use  of  a  discrete-continuous  demand  model  that  allows  us  to  identify  the
magnitude of the latent demand, accounts for consumer heterogeneity and has
finite satiation levels of consumption both with respect to the number and length
of connections.15 These features are important, for the number and (average)
length of established connections vary between periods for a given consumer, and
between consumers within a given period, and are bounded even during the ex-
periment periods when the prices are zero.
The model is built on the analysis of a single wireless service connection:
whether or not to make it, and if, at what length. We assume that the utility func-
tion from consuming a connection of length (in minutes) q when the connection
fee is K and the per-minute price is p is given by the commonly used additively
separable form )(),( pqKqV +-a , where V(.) is concave and twice continuously
differentiable in q, and a  is a demand parameter explained below.16
We introduce two types of demand shocks that determine observed behav-
ior.  The  timing  is  as  follows:  First,  a  consumer  faces  consumption  (connection)
needs that are derived from a stochastic process. We define a need as an instance
where  a  consumer  would  establish  a  connection  of  strictly  positive  length  if  the
prices of doing so were zero. The need distribution will below be made a function
of consumer characteristics: We image for example that there can be cross-
15 Dubin and McFadden (1984) are an early example of a discrete-continuous demand model to
which class our model also belongs.
16 This is a commonly used transformation both in the Industrial Organization literature. For its
derivation, see e.g. Tirole (1988, pp. 143). It is also commonly used in telecommunications analy-
sis (e.g. Mitchell, 1978).
8sectional variation in the frequency at which consumers have a need to check the
weather forecast (through wireless internet) before embarking on a long drive.
Second, once a connection need arrives, the consumer receives a connec-
tion-specific demand shock, a . We assume that ( , )V q a  is increasing in a  and
that it determines the strength of the need, i.e., the satiation length of a given con-
nection. The satiation length will also be made a function of consumer character-
istics.  For  example,  one  might  presume  that  young  people  have  higher  satiation
demands for games. We follow the long literature on discrete choice by making
Assumption 1: The connection-specific demand shock, a , is an independent and
identically distributed random shock with a known probability density function
( )f a , with support [0, )¥ .
The cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of a is denoted ( )F a ,  which we
take to be continuous, monotonically increasing, and twice continuously differen-
tiable. Because the consumer establishes a wireless connection only if her con-
sumer surplus from the connection is non-negative, the optimal length of a service
connection is
(1) [ ])(),(maxarg),,( pqKqVKpq +-= aa
if ò
¥
³º
p
KdgpCS tat );()(  and zero otherwise. This decision rule determines
whether or not to make a single wireless service connection, and if, at what
length. This means that conditional on a connection need, a consumer will estab-
lish a wireless service connection with probability [ ]1 ( ( , ))F p Kp a= - , where
( , )p Ka  is the unique value of the shock that is implicitly defined by
( ; ( , )) ( ; ( , ))
p
CS p p K q p K d Ka t a t
¥
º ºò . It follows that for a sequence of y con-
9nection needs, the number of connections established follows a binomial distribu-
tion with parameters y and p .
To introduce the stochastic process generating the need shocks, we lean on a
large telecommunications engineering literature and assume that the needs are
draws from a Poisson distribution:17
Assumption 2: The number of connection needs during a given time interval, y, is
distributed Poisson with mean m .
Assumption 2 means that the expected number of consumption needs for
wireless services during a time interval is m . Our model, coupled with Assump-
tions 1 and 2, yields the following result:
RESULT: The number of connections made during a given time interval, Y , is
given by a Poisson-stopped Binomial: Y ~ Poisson with [ ]E Y X mp= .18
Summing up, there are two types of demand shocks that determine observed be-
havior: First, consumers face connection needs that are derived from a Poisson
process. Once a need arrives, the consumers receive a connection-specific draw of
a  from the distribution ( )f a , which determines how strong the need is. Given
the connection need and armed with knowledge of prices p and K and the value of
a , the consumer calculates whether her utility is maximized by establishing a
connection of the optimal length, or by not connecting at all. A connection is es-
tablished with probability 1 ( ( , ))F p Kp a= - ,  and  the  number  of  connections  is
thus the result of consumer optimization.
17 See e.g. http://www.jdstelecom.com/telecom.php (“Use to find the number of trunks required for
an offered traffic to have a specified probability of blocking. All assume random (Poisson) arrivals
and exponential call holding times.”), where tools based on our type of modeling of the number
and length of calls is promoted (accessed 30 May 2004).
18 The result follows directly from the properties of the two stochastic processes (see, e.g., Lemma
1.1.4 of Cameron and Trivedi 1998, pp. 8) and Assumptions 1 and 2.
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Operationalization of the model
To make the model operational, we have to make further assumptions about the
expected number of consumption opportunities for wireless services during the
time interval [ m ], the density of the demand shift shock [ ( )f a ], and the form of
demand determining the optimal connection length [ ( )q p ].
The number of consumption needs that consumer i faces during time period
t (= 1, 2, …, 7), yit, corresponds in our model to the consumer’s satiation demand
during the period. Satiation demand is typically unobservable. We can however
measure it, because during the experiment periods pt = Kt = 0, implying that
( , ) 0t tp Ka =  and 1 (0) 1Fp = - =  for t = 3, 4, 5. The number of connections
made  during  the  experiment  period  therefore  reflects  latent  demand  and  a  com-
plete fulfillment of needs. Thus ity  = itY , and by Assumption (2), yit is distributed
Poisson with mean m . We allow for heterogeneity and model the mean satiation
demand of consumer i flexibly  as  a  function  of  demographics.  We assume,  spe-
cifically, that exp( ( ; ))i ig zm m=
% %
, where g( ,iz m
% %
) is an initially unknown function
of the vector of consumer demographics iz%
 and the associated vector of parame-
ters m
%
.
The theory is silent about the distribution of the demand shift parameter a ,
which assumes a different value for each need that consumer i faces during period
t. Following the telecommunications engineering literature, we specify that a  has
a (stationary) exponential distribution. However, we allow for heterogeneity as
follows: ija ~ )exp( il , with 1/ij iE a lé ù =ë û , where j indexes connection needs (j =
0, …, yit) of consumer i during period t . The mean depends on consumer demo-
11
graphics, i.e., ( , )i ik zl l= % %
, where ( , )ik z l% %
 is an initially unknown function of the
vector of consumer demographics iz%
 and the associated vector of parameters l
%
.
Absent an established practice, we consider two different demand specifica-
tions for ( )q p . We assume that the demand for the service (and thus the length of
the connection) is either a linear ( tiijjit pq ga -=, ) or a log-linear
( )exp(, tiijjit pq ga -= ) function of the per-minute price pt. Besides simplicity, the
strength of these demand functions is  that  they allow us to parameterize ig  as a
function of consumer demographics ( 'i izg g= %%
). They make our analysis compa-
rable with recent analyses of telecommunications demand,19 provide a robustness
check to each other and, consistent with our data, allow for a point of satiation.
Estimation and identification of demand parameters
Together with the above auxiliary assumptions, the theoretical model implies that
the number of connections made by consumer i during period t, itY ,  follows  a
Poisson-stopped Binomial process with mean [ , , ]it t t i i itE Y p K z m p= . However,
when estimating the model parameters we only make use of the moment condition
given by the conditional mean.20 The conditional mean can be re-written as
(2) [ ][ , , ] 1 ( ( , ) exp( ( , ) ( , ))it t t i i t t i i t tE Y p K z F p K g z p Km a m l a= - = -
% %
,
where ( , ) ( ' ) 2( ' )t t i t i tp K z p z Ka g g= +
% %% %
 in the case of linear demand and
( , ) ( ' ) exp(( ' ) )t t i t i tp K z K z pa g g= % %% %
 in the case of log-linear demand. It is our theo-
19 Our analysis differs from the previous studies because we use the two functional forms side-by-
side and data on wireless services, not voice calls. In addition, our data is from an experiment, and
we use flexible estimation methods. For studies using the linear demand function, see for example
Miravete (2002) and Miravete and Röller (2003). The log-linear demand is known as “Perl-
demand” in the telecommunications literature; see Taylor (2002) for a recent review of this litera-
ture.
20 That is, we do not impose the potentially very restrictive Poisson density or variance assump-
tion; see, for example, Gourieroux, Montfort and Trognon (1984a,b), and Wooldridge (1997).
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retical model that imposes the restriction that the coefficients of the per-minute
price and the connection fee are not allowed to differ. Lack of sufficient (inter-
temporal or cross-sectional) price variation means that it is not feasible to relax
this restriction in our econometric specification.
In identifying the parameters and unknown functions of the conditional
mean, we utilize the unique feature of our data that we have three periods where
both prices (pt and Kt) are set to zero. Although in general we have censoring in
the model, i.e., a consumer establishes a connection only if she faces a need and if
the associated demand shock is large enough, during the experiment periods, there
is no censoring. The experiment (pt = Kt = 0) implies that  whenever there was a
need, and whatever the realization of the demand shock, a connection was estab-
lished. To make use of this identifying information we adopt a two-step m-
estimator where the first step is a non-parametric (series) estimator (see Newey
1994a for general consistency results and also Newey 1994b and Pakes and Olley
1995, who consider related semiparametric m-estimators). In the first step, we a)
use data on the number of connections during the experiment periods to estimate
flexibly the initially unknown function determining the satiation number of con-
nections (i.e., the expected number of needs of consumer i) and b) use the average
connection length during the experiment periods to estimate flexibly the initially
unknown function determining the mean of the demand shift shock. In the second
step, we use the predicted values from the first-step and identify the price effects
using the price variation induced by the experiment.
The first step identifies and estimates the latent demand as follows: First,
because ity  = itY  for t =  3,  4,  5,  variation  in  the  number  of  connections  equals
variation in the number of needs. This variation identifies exp( ( , ))i ig zm m=
% %
. We
run regressions of the form
13
(3) [ | 0, 0, ] exp( ( , ))it t t i i iE Y p K z g zm m= = = =
% %
for t = 3,4 and 5, and estimate g( ,iz m
% %
) flexibly using a power series estimator and
cross-validation. Cross-validation leads to a mean-square error minimizing choice
of the number of terms and allows for a choice of data-dependent number of terms
(see Li 1987, Hausman and Newey 1995, Newey 1997). We let iz%
 consist of con-
sumers’ age, gender and place of residence, and their powers and interactions.
The other parameter of latent demand is ( , )i ik zl l= % %
, which determines the
mean of the demand shift shocks. Variation in connection lengths across consum-
ers during the experiment identifies ( , )i ik zl l= % %
, because every time a consumer
faced a consumption need during the experiment, she utilized it with probability
one and made a wireless service connection of the length that gave her satiation.
In terms of our model, this implies that
(4) ( | 0, 0, ) 1/ 1/ ( , )it t t i i iE q p K z k zl l= = = = % %
,
for t = 3, 4 and 5. To estimate ( , )ik z l% %
 flexibly we use a power series estimator
and cross-validation. For this estimation we use data on the average duration  of
connections of consumer i during period t (t = 3, 4 and 5), because that is what we
observe.
In the second step we estimate the price effects, parameterized by ' izg
%%
, us-
ing the conditional mean equation to which the predicted values from the first step
have been plugged in. That is, we insert iˆl  and ˆim  into (2) to obtain
(5) ˆˆˆ ˆ[ , , ] 1 ( ( , ) exp( ( , ))it t t i i t t i i t tE Y p K z F p K p Km a m l aé ù= - = -ë û .
where ( , )t tp Ka  is a function of ' izg %%
. The price variation induced by the experi-
ment identifies the price effects, and we allow them to vary with the age, gender
and place of residence of the consumer. To estimate g
%
, we make use of the mo-
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ment condition (5) and the method of pseudo-maximum likelihood, which belongs
to the class of m-estimators (as required; see Newey 1994a, p. 3 and Cameron and
Trivedi 2005, p. 200-202). Following the recommendation of Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, p. 202) and the example of Pakes and Olley (1995), we bootstrap
the second step standard errors.
3.2 Step 2: Supply side analysis
One of the central benefits from estimating a structural model is the ability to re-
cover supply-side unobservables, which in our case are marginal costs. A chal-
lenge that we face is that one of the explanations for the slow take-up of the early
WAP services is that, conditional on the latent demand being there, the pricing of
these services was not necessarily optimal.
To explore whether the prices were set (sub)optimally and, by implication,
whether a pricing mistake could explain the slow take-up, we resort to a three part
approach. We first use the supply side moments (first order conditions) of our
model, assuming monopoly pricing, to estimate the implied marginal costs of both
a new connection, and a one minute lengthening of an existing connection. The
monopoly assumption seems feasible on the following four grounds (that we de-
tail further in part A of the Appendix): First, mobile internet services were addi-
tional  (add-on)  services  within  an  already  chosen  wireless  plan;  second,  the  ex-
penditures on voice calls dominated over expenditures on mobile internet; third,
the lack of number portability (see e.g. Viard 2006) strongly restrained customers
from switching operators; and fourth, assuming monopoly pricing will give us a
lower bound estimate of marginal costs. If one’s prior is that the prices were too
high, the static monopoly assumption is conservative. Given that the operator may
have behaved as a monopolist in relation to WAP services, we can solve the first
order  conditions  for  (static)  profit  maximization,  and  use  these  to  estimate  the
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marginal costs implied by our model. We provide the FOCs in part A of the Ap-
pendix.
The second part of our approach makes use of the results of a structured
survey that we administered to acknowledged industry experts. The data gener-
ated by this survey is a substitute for the (hard) marginal cost data which we lack.
In the survey the respondents were first asked point estimates of the two marginal
costs. We then asked a couple of auxiliary questions and finally elicited informa-
tion on the distribution of marginal costs, following the work of Dominitz and
Manski (1996, 1997). While straightforward in principle, conducting a structured
survey for this paper’s purposes was not trivial for two reasons: First, the respon-
dents were typically not familiar with the economic concept of marginal cost.21
Second, it took a considerable amount of effort to be able to identify people who
have in depth knowledge about the costs and who thus a priori are in a position to
be able to give informative answers. We were able to elicit 18 responses with a
50% response rate (for details, see part B of the Appendix).
The  third  part  of  our  approach  is  to  compare  the  (mean and  median)  mar-
ginal cost estimates of the industry experts with the estimates from our model.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
The sample was constructed by identifying all the customers of the operator who
had  a  private  phone  and  who  during  the  two  middle  weeks  of  the  six-week  ex-
periment (i.e., during period 4) established at least one wireless Internet connec-
tion. While the campaign was well advertised and had been running for two
21 Indeed, of the 36 experts that we approached, half declined to answer our questionnaire after
having read the questions, citing as reason that they felt they did not have the necessary expertise
or information to provide answers.
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weeks, it may still be possible that not all (potential) users are included in our
data.22 Because the expected number of needs during a two-week period varies
over customers, one group of the excluded could be those with a very low number
of needs: given that prices were zero the maintained assumption is that everybody
hit with a need establishes a connection. Missing these individuals from our sam-
ple may induce an upward bias in our estimates of the number of needs. A simple
calculation indicates that this type of selection is not likely to be an issue.23 Sec-
ond, if one drops the maintained assumption of establishing a connection at zero
prices given a need, we might miss customers with high opportunity costs. Such
selection would bias our results towards too low price elasticities.24
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the sample, separately for the
non-experiment and experiment periods, as well as the basic consumer demo-
graphics. We have a balanced panel with 14882 consumer-period observations (N
= 2126 and T = 7). During the non-experiment periods, the average number of
wireless connections (WAP_COUNT) per a two-week period is 1.13. The average
connection length (CALL_DUR) is 2.66 minutes. During the experiment periods,
usage grows dramatically: The average number of needs (=number of connections
during the experiment periods) is 11.94 per a two-week period. The average satia-
22 In Finland, mobile phone customers buy their phones from private vendors, not from operators.
The operator in our case thus does not know how many of its customers had a WAP enabled phone
during the observation period. Consequently, we don’t know how many of the potential users we
have in our data.
23 Making the Poisson assumption and using our mean latent demand estimate, the probability of
having zero needs during the 2nd experiment period is 11.54Pr[ 0] e 0.00001ity
-= = » . It appears
that the bias in the mean estimate would have to be very large for this type of selection to be an
issue.
24 As the time period for the experiment was short, the price experiment was limited to wireless
Internet services, there was no phone-number portability in Finland yet,24 and the vast majority of
mobile phone usage was created from voice calls and SMS messages, we do not believe there was
any selection into the sample. It is, however, still conceivable that some individuals might have
changed operators to take advantage of the experiment. These would presumably be people with a
high number of needs but high price elasticity (as their own operators were offering the same ser-
vices for positive prices). The existence of such selection would bias our estimates of the number
of needs and our price elasticity estimates upwards.
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tion connection length (= length of connection during the experiment period) is
5.54 minutes. There is, however, a lot of variation.
The table also shows that we have two kinds of wireless plans in the data:
Plan “A” is clearly more popular, as 86% of the consumers subscribe to it. In this
plan, the per-minute charge (WAP_PMIN) is 0.12 euros and the fixed connection
fee  (WAP_K)  is  0.09  euros  per  connection.  In  the  empirics  that  follow,  we  use
data from this larger plan only and use the other for a robustness analysis.25
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 shows that the experiment increases usage dramatically, and that any dif-
ference in behavior before and after the experiment are small. Below we demon-
strate that the latter point holds closer scrutiny and therefore proceed treating pre-
and post-experiment data identically.
4.2 Estimation results and their implications
For brevity, we turn directly to the demand and supply side implications of the
model and present the first step cross-validation of exp( ( , ))ig z m
% %
 and ( , )ik z l% %
and
estimation results ( iˆl  and ˆim ) and the second step estimation results ( iˆg ) in part C
of the Appendix.
Step 1: Demand side implications
The demand side implications of the model are summarized in Table 2. It shows
the decomposition of the demand for wireless services into the number of needs
(i.e., the latent demand) and the conditional probability of establishing a connec-
tion, given a need. The expected number of connections established (i.e., the
quantity demanded) as well as a number of different price elasticities are also re-
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ported. We have computed these estimates for each individual as a function of her
demographics and evaluated them, where appropriate, at the market price. The
means and the standard deviations that are reported in the Table are computed
over the cross-section of consumers.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The first demand side implication is the magnitude of latent demand: The average
satiation demand is 11.5 needs per consumer over a two-week period, or about
300 connections a year.26 Consumption needs arose thus almost daily. These
numbers suggest that lack of latent demand for the new wireless Internet services
cannot explain their slow take-up.
The second demand implication is that given a need, the conditional prob-
ability of opening a connection is on average only 10%, i.e., only every tenth need
translates into a connection. This probability translates into a low expected num-
ber of connections (30 p.a.) at the then charged market prices. Thus, the quantity
demanded appears to have remained low because of (high) prices. The estimated
price elasticities, evaluated at the market price, provide further support for this
conclusion. The average per-minute price (pt)  elasticity  of connection length is
high, ranging from -1.87 (log-linear demand) to -2.28 (linear demand). The per-
minute price (pt) and the fixed fee (Kt) elasticities of the number of wireless con-
nections are high, too. For the linear (log-linear) demand, the average per-minute
price elasticity of the number of wireless connections is -1.59 (-4.47). The average
fixed fee elasticity of the number of wireless connections is -0.39 (-2.37) for the
25 We did not resort to using the data from the two plans together even if that would have given us
cross-sectional variation in prices. The reason is that we wanted to avoid any selection bias that
this might have induced (as selection into the plans is endogenous).
26 The magnitude of latent demand is independent from the choice of the functional form for q(p),
because for pt = 0, they are identical.
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linear (log-linear) demand. Note that these are short-run elasticities, and the long-
run elasticities, which our data do not allow us to estimate, may be even higher.
Figure 1 shows the age profile of latent demand and the conditional prob-
ability of opening a connection, given a need.27 It suggests that consumer hetero-
geneity is important, too. It seems that needs decrease with age, but that the prob-
ability of actually satisfying the needs using the services increases with age. Thus
a 20 year old had almost twice as many connection needs as a 70 year old, but his
probability of connection was only half of that of the 70 year old.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To sum up, the demand side results support two conclusions: First, lack of
latent demand for WAP enabled wireless Internet services cannot explain their
initially slow take-up. Second, demand remained latent because of high prices,
and the early demand for the wireless services appears to have been highly elastic.
These results raise the question of whether prices were optimally set.
Step 2: Supply side implications
We  report  the  marginal  costs  implied  by  the  model  and  the  (mean  and  median)
marginal cost estimates of the industry experts in Table 3.28 As can be seen from
the Table, the linear and log-linear models imply quite different marginal costs:
the linear demand model yields an estimated marginal connection cost (C) of 0.03
euros, while that given by the log-linear model is 0.07 euros. As to the marginal
cost of connection length (c), the linear (log-linear) model yields an estimate of
0.07 (0.08) euros. Because of the maintained assumption of static monopoly pric-
ing, these numbers should be thought as lower bound estimates of the marginal
27 The plot is drawn for the linear demand specification using data for males that live in the Hel-
sinki capital area. The pattern for log-linear demand is similar.
28 No standard errors for the estimated marginal costs can be provided due to lack of variation in
prices during the non-experiment periods.
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costs: Most, if not all, models of dynamic monopoly or oligopolistic competition
suggest that the observed prices should have been closer to marginal costs.
The average (median) expert opinion point-estimate of C is 0.015 (0.010)
euros and that of c 0.011 (0.010) euros.29  The expected values of C and c, as elic-
ited from the subjective marginal cost distributions, provide a similar picture. The
average (median) of these over the survey respondents is 0.022 (0.013) and 0.020
(0.008) euros. The maximum point estimates from the survey are C = 0.050 and c
= 0.040 euros. In the distribution part of the survey, we first asked for the lower
and upper bound of the relevant marginal cost’s support, and then the probability
of the true value falling into each of the quintiles. The medians of the upper
bounds were C = 0.040 and c = 0.030 euros.
We can make use of the survey data and the fact that our monopoly assump-
tion gives us a lower bound estimate of the marginal costs to calculate the prob-
ability that the two marginal costs (C and c) are at least as high as those backed
out from the model. Assuming a normal distribution and taking the mean and
standard error estimates from Table 3 as its first two moments, we find that these
probabilities are exceedingly small for all but the marginal cost of connection
from the linear model.
Comparing these two sets of marginal cost estimates supports the conclu-
sion that the marginal costs implied by both demand models, especially the one on
connection length, are too high.30 These  results  support  the  conclusion  that  sub-
optimal prices may explain the commercial failure of the early WAP services, and
suggest a number of counterfactual experiments.
29 Using answers to our technical check-question as a screen, we discarded 5 of the 18 respondents
from the final sample (see section B of the Appendix). Using all 18 respondents’ answers, the
medians are the same as those reported in Table 3. The means are: C = 0.030, c = 0.032 which,
while higher, are still below the model-based estimates.
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[Insert Table 3 here]
4.3 Counterfactual experiments and surplus calculations
We perform three counterfactual experiments. As the first experiment, we infer
optimal prices using the estimated demand model and the marginal costs provided
by the expert survey. As the second experiment, we disallow the use of a two-part
tariff. Third, we impose marginal cost pricing. We focus on usage and welfare
implications. We use the average marginal costs calculated from the respondents’
marginal cost distributions as these are the highest and thus for our purposes the
most conservative estimates.31
 [Insert Table 4 here]
There  are  four  rows  in  Table  4  for  each  demand specification.  The  first  one  re-
ports the figures for the actual prices; the second, for optimal prices; the third for
the case with no connection fee (but with optimal p); and the fourth for the case of
marginal cost pricing. We report i) the probability of connecting given a need; ii)
the average length of the connection; iii) annual producer surplus per customer;
and iv) average annual consumer surplus.
We start with the results obtained using linear demand. With actual prices,
the estimated annual producer (consumer) surplus per customer is 17.05 (16.40)
euros. Marginal cost pricing would have yielded an average annual total welfare
of 61.33 euros. The dead-weight loss is thus 46% of the welfare attainable at mar-
ginal  cost  pricing.  Consumer  behavior  would  have  changed  a  lot  had  the  prices
30 It also seems that the relative magnitudes given by the log-linear model are more in line with the
survey evidence than those obtained from the linear model.
31 Yet an additional experiment of interest is to abolish the 22% value added tax (VAT) that ap-
plied to the early wireless services. This counterfactual suggests that keeping prices constant but
abolishing the tax would have resulted in a 416% (140%) increase in the number of connections
with log-linear (linear) demand. An important implication of this finding is that when the demand
for a new good or service is elastic, taxation may reduce its usage and slow down its take off con-
siderably (see also Goolsbee 2000).
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been optimal: The average connection probability increases by 58% and the aver-
age connection length decreases by about 18% with optimal prices. The corre-
sponding change in consumer (producer) surplus is 28% (5.5%). The dead-weight
loss with optimal prices (conditional on the two-part tariff, i.e., actual pricing
structure) is still 36%. Abolishing the possibility of using two-part tariffs in-
creases the connection probability, shortens the expected duration of a connection,
and increases both producer (3%) and consumer surplus (26%).
Turning to the log-linear specification (lower part of the Table) we find the
changes to be larger than those obtained using the linear demand model. With
actual prices, the estimated profit per customer (average consumer surplus) is 4.12
(1.09) euros. The dead-weight loss is almost 90%, as marginal cost pricing yields
an average annual total welfare of 43.74 euros per customer. Going from actual to
optimal prices increases the connection probability seven-fold and the connection
length by 5%. Producer surplus more than triples, consumer surplus increases
nearly 13-fold and the dead-weight loss decreases to 35%. Imposing K = 0 has a
bigger effect in relative terms than with the linear demand: The producer (con-
sumer surplus) is 54% (95%) of that with an optimal two-part tariff.
5 Interpretation and robustness
5.1 Interpretation of the empirical evidence
Understanding the demand for the early WAP services
Our analysis shows that demand existed for the early wireless services at the time
of the experiment in 2001. It however appears to have been surprisingly elastic.
Our interpretation of the high own-price elasticity is that the pre-3G wireless ser-
vices had close (quality-adjusted) substitutes. Early WAP compatible mobile
phones had a relatively small and difficult to use screen and keypad. They did not
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support (many) colors either, reducing the quality of graphics. The early wireless
Internet technologies were also quite slow, partly competed with the existing short
message services, and essentially repackaged a set of existing digital services that
were relatively easily available through other channels of distribution. The avail-
ability of wireline Internet access was relatively widespread in Western Europe by
2001 (and broadband was on the rise, OECD 2001), and we conjecture that the
(quality-adjusted) cost of access was competitive relative to the wireless services.
A comparison of the success of the early WAP with the early diffusion of i-
mode, a service brand of NTT DoCoMo which took off quite rapidly after its in-
troduction in February 1999 in Japan, provides a reality check of the above inter-
pretation.32 First, i-mode’s overall usability appears to have been somewhat better.
It was, for example, a bit faster, and supported colors. Second, when i-mode was
introduced, the take up of wireline Internet was relatively modest in Japan com-
pared to Western Europe, making its content relatively novel. Finally, it seems
that a number of the services made available by i-mode were not widely available
in Japan before, suggesting less repackaging.33 All this suggests that i-mode had
fewer substitutes and better quality than WAP. A back-of-the-envelope price
comparison (see part D of the Appendix) nevertheless indicates that the prices of
the early WAP enabled wireless services were, at least in Finland, in all likelihood
higher than the prices of the comparable services in Japan: The conditional con-
nection probability, given a need, would have been higher than it actually was,
had the prices of the WAP services been lower and thus closer to the price level of
i-mode.
32 Most of the descriptive details in this paragraph are from Kakkori (2001).
33 Examples of new services are messages across operators’ networks, and picture downloads.
Especially entertainment related services, such as “What's new” -information services and music
sites, became popular early on (Marketing Interactive Network, 2000).
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Understanding the pricing of the early WAP services
Usually in the IO literature firms are assumed to set their prices optimally. Our
results suggest that prices were sub-optimally high but leave open whether the
operator systematically failed to maximize its profits when setting its prices or
whether we have identified an isolated pricing mistake.
We are inclined to prefer the latter for the following two reasons. First, the
operator has a long and successful history of providing (fixed and mobile) voice
services which still form its main revenue source. It thus seems that it knew how
to price voice services. Second, mobile internet services were a new product not
only to the customers, but also to the firm, and quite different from the “old”
voice services the firm was used to producing. It therefore seems possible that the
firm made a mistake in pricing something it was unfamiliar with. That firms may
make mistakes or not optimize in such a situation is not entirely new: Levitt
(2006) provides evidence against optimal pricing in absence of sufficient market
feedback using a case study, and Ellison (2005) discusses the need to apply be-
havioral economics in IO to the supply side of the market.
Our conjecture on why the operator made a pricing mistake is that the op-
erator failed to appreciate how elastic the demand for the early WAP services was.
As our results show, pinning down the elasticity/elasticities exactly (and under-
standing its drivers) was not a trivial task even when usage data and econometric
models are employed. For what it is worth, our auxiliary survey evidence (see
section 5.3) also support this conjecture: Even with hindsight, industry experts
have widely differing opinions on how elastic the demand for the early WAP ser-
vices was.
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5.2 Robustness of the demand side analysis
Alternative explanations for the existence of latent demand and high
estimated elasticities
There are at least three competing explanations from outside our model that might
explain either the magnitude of the latent demand or the high estimated elastic-
ities,  or both: First, experimentation by consumers during the experiment period
in order to learn quality may have increased usage during the experiment period.
This could bias our parameter estimates towards too strong latent demand or high
elasticities. A testable implication of this type of learning is that if the consumers
learned that they liked (disliked) the services, the demand (number of connec-
tions) after the experiment should have been higher (lower) than before the ex-
periment. We should also observe declining usage during the experiment period.
Second, some of the services (e.g. paying bills) are such that one might be able to
shift their consumption in time. Knowledge of the start and end of the experiment
period might have induced consumers to shift their consumption to the zero-price
experiment periods, again biasing our results. The testable implication of this is
that the demand in the non-experimental periods adjacent to the experiment peri-
ods would be systematically lower than in other non-experimental periods. Third,
the advertising related to the price experiment may have shifted demand, implying
again an upward bias both in the estimated magnitude of latent demand and price
elasticities.  If  advertising’s  effects  last  a  few  weeks,  the  number  of  connections
should be higher and their average length longer during the post-experiment peri-
ods than in the pre-experiment periods.
To test these implications we ran a number of reduced-form regressions ex-
plaining the number of connections and their length by consumer and period indi-
cators. These regressions show that there is only a little, if any, evidence for learn-
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ing, consumption shifting in time or an advertising effect  (see part  E of the Ap-
pendix).
Data and specification choices
We have data from two different wireless plans (plans “A” and “B”), but only
used data on plan “A” customers to generate our main findings above. We can
therefore address the question of whether our demand-side results are an artifact
of the estimating sample by re-estimating our model using data on customers from
the  other  pricing  plan.  We  have  data  on  306  consumers  who  subscribed  to  this
(less popular) plan. The results (see part F of the Appendix) are in line with those
obtained above with plan “A”.
One way to check the robustness of our results with respect to our specifica-
tion is to consider simpler specifications. We imposed consumer homogeneity,
i.e., im m= , il l=  and ig g=  for all i. The results echo our previous findings. In
the linear demand case the annual average consumer surplus is 15.53 euros per
consumer. We have repeated our analysis also for other combinations of the ex-
planatory variables, but found no significant differences.
A deeper criticism challenges our entire demand model. To provide an al-
ternative estimate, we generate a standard reduced form estimate of demand elas-
ticity and consumer surplus in spirit of Hausman (1997, 1999) and Brynjolfsson,
Hu and Smith (2003). Hausman shows that a good measure of the total effect on
consumer welfare can be based on the compensating variation (CV). The results
from these estimations show that the own-price elasticity is -10.84 and the annual
per-consumer surplus 0.56 euros (see part G of the Appendix for details). Estimat-
ing these elasticities and consumer surpluses in several alternative ways reinforces
this result.
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The final question we ask is which of the two demand specifications better
fits  the  data.  To  answer  the  question,  we  performed  an  out-of-sample  test:  We
calculated the predicted call lengths from both models at actual prices, and com-
pared them to the observed call lengths during the non-experiment periods as
these were not exploited in the estimation. The difference between predicted and
actual is 4.13 (-.74) minutes for the linear (log-linear) model, both significant at
the 1% level. The difference in the (mean) squared prediction error (between the
two models) is 17.01 with p-value .000, i.e., the linear model’s prediction error is
systematically larger. Thus, while the log-linear model slightly but systematically
underestimates the call length, it produces better out-of-sample estimates than the
linear model. This finding suggests that we should emphasize the results obtained
from the log-linear model over those from the linear model. Doing so would
strengthen our conclusions.
Comparability with existing demand side evidence
Many studies suggest that the demand for new goods and services is relatively
inelastic, particularly in mobile telecommunications (Hausman 1997, 2002). In
this light our results seem puzzling. However, the results from the emerging litera-
ture on the demand for Internet (access) are close to ours. Goolsbee (2006) finds
that the demand elasticity for broadband Internet access ranged from -2.2 to -3.7
in the U.S around 1999. Varian (2000) portrays a similar picture. Using data from
the Berkeley INDEX experiments, he finds that the own-price elasticities for
bandwidth were between -2 and -3. Finally, Ellison and Ellison (2004) study the
effects of price search on the Internet on demand elasticity, and document Internet
price elasticities that are very high, sometimes of magnitude -50. None of these
studies is directly comparable to ours, but they put the elasticity of the demand for
the early WAP into a perspective.
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Our welfare results and particularly estimates of the realized consumer sur-
plus may also seem puzzling in light of the recent research on new goods and ser-
vices, as a number of papers document large consumer gains from various new
goods and services (Trajtenberg 1989, Breshanan and Gordon 1997, Petrin 2002,
Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith 2003) and particularly from (tele)communications
product/service innovations (e.g., Hausman 1997, 1999, Goolsbee and Petrin
2004). For example, if we take one of our largest consumer surplus estimates, the
realized per-consumer welfare from the early wireless services is less than 15% of
the gains that satellite TV channel buyers experienced in the U.S. (Goolsbee and
Petrin 2004).34 The puzzle is, however, more apparent than real, for all the earlier
papers analyze successful launches  of  new  goods.  As  our  counterfactual  experi-
ments show, the launch of the early WAP services could have been more success-
ful and consumer surpluses substantially higher than those actually obtained.
5.3 Robustness of the supply side analysis
Quality of marginal cost estimates
Our supply side analysis relies to a large extent on the plausibility of the mean and
median marginal cost estimates of the industry experts. We have considered their
plausibility in two ways.
First, we analyzed the cost structure of WAP services via a series of in depth
interviews with an industry expert to identify the drivers of the marginal costs of
the operator supplying the WAP services. We learnt that the operator provided the
service mostly in-house and owned (most of) the infrastructure needed for its pro-
vision. It also turned out that the amount of electricity that a WAP connection
34 All these numbers are naturally based on short-run elasticities, but given the equipment costs,
the estimated consumer welfare figures do suggest that the long-run figures (through adoption)
wouldn’t be much greater.
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uses is negligible; that apart from one area in central (capital) Helsinki, congestion
was not an issue; and that all the equipment owned by the operator and used to run
the network constituted towards fixed, not variable cost (as the equipment did not
depreciate with usage). Besides electricity, the only additional outlays from estab-
lishing or lengthening a WAP connection appears to have come from two sources.
First,  the  operator  paid  (on  the  basis  of  an  undisclosed  contract)  a  small  usage-
based charge to firms operating and owning some but not all of the antennas and
links (relays) of the network. Second, the operator had revenue sharing agree-
ments with content providers which seemingly were of minor importance. All this
information, in addition to the survey results, suggests to us that the relevant mar-
ginal costs were very low in absolute terms.35
As a  second check  of  the  quality  of  the  marginal  cost  estimates,  we  asked
the survey respondents whether a WAP connection was technically identical to a
(GSM) voice connection as well as their point estimates of the two marginal costs
of a GSM connection. This is a true statement, and we used it as a check on their
understanding of the technology used for WAP services. Most respondents (13 out
of 18) answered the question correctly. We only used the answers of those re-
spondents that at least partly agreed with the claim.
Auxiliary survey evidence
Expanding the supply side analysis to e.g. include other firms and alternative
market structures is not possible due to lack of data. We can, however, benchmark
some of our supply side findings against the views of the industry experts. As part
of the survey we asked whether the charged prices were too high; what the opti-
mal prices would have been; and what the price elasticity of WAP services was in
35 The marginal cost estimates of the expert we interviewed in depth echo this view, as they were
close to the lower bound of the estimates obtained via the survey.
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2001. The survey gives some support for the statement that the charged prices
were  too  high  (average  2.7,  mode  =  3  and  median  =  3  on  a  4-point  Likert  scale
with 1 = strongly disagree, …, and 4 = strongly agree). Four out of five respon-
dents suggest lower prices than those actually charged:36 The suggested prices are
in fact close to the optimal prices implied by the log-linear model, as the mean
(median) suggested per-minute price is 0.040 (0.050) euros and the mean sug-
gested connection fee 0.039 (0.050) euros. Consistent with our interpretation, the
respondents  found it  difficult  to  provide  an  estimate  for  the  elasticity  of  the  de-
mand and the estimates varied considerably. While we do not want to put too
much weight on these subjective, ex post views, they appear to be in line with our
main conclusions.
6 Conclusions
New goods and services play a fundamental role in how markets improve our liv-
ing standards. A stylized fact is that most product launches fail, implying that an
improved understanding of what might go wrong is of great importance. The mo-
bile Internet is an example of a recently launched new service that, at least ini-
tially, stumbled. In Europe, the early take-up of the new class of wireless services
enabled by mobile phones was initially slower than expected. We studied why.
A key part of answering the question of how the launch of a particular new
good or service succeeds is to understand its demand. We find that needs to use
mobile Internet were plenty, and thus that lack of latent demand cannot explain
their sluggish initial adoption. Contrasting the marginal cost estimates derived
from our model with those obtained from a structured survey of industry experts
36 There is only one price suggestion that is strictly higher than the actual prices: One respondent
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we conclude that the marginal costs implied by the model are too high. Because of
the conservative assumptions that we have made, our preferred interpretation of
this – backed with auxiliary survey evidence – is that sub-optimally high prices
explain the commercial failure of the early WAP services. Indeed, our counterfac-
tual pricing experiments suggest that pricing (and taxation) of the services had a
strong effect, curtailing usage. This finding provides support for the hypothesis of
Levitt (2006) that deviations from profit maximization are more likely when firms
operate in a new or unfamiliar environment, e.g., when they have had insufficient
time or market feedback to learn to set prices optimally.
Our analysis also suggests that with the linear demand model, both producer
and consumer surplus would have increased if the operator had priced optimally
as a monopolist. With the log-linear demand (which fits the data somewhat better
than the linear model), the increases would have been even larger. The realized
producer surpluses per consumer and welfare gains to an (early) adopter of these
services were on average moderate, 4-17 euros and 1-16 euros a year, respec-
tively. These contrast with an estimated 40-60 euro potential total surplus. These
findings  are  consistent  with  the  early  adoption  experiences  and  critical  accounts
that were aired at the time our experiment was run.
Our results suggest that the very modest welfare created by what clearly was
a run-of-the-mill new service could have been greatly increased by different pric-
ing. The larger issue is that the risks attached to welfare creation through new
goods do not stop at the invention stage, but continue well into the innovation and
diffusion stage, and that a better understanding of how to handle those commer-
cial risks, especially those arising from pricing, could significantly raise the social
and private returns to innovation.
suggested that the optimal p is 0.10 euros.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Non-experiment periods 1-2 and 6-7 Obs: N*4 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Connection duration (CALL_DUR)
 - Prop. of customers with # of connections > 0 8504 0.239 0.427 0 1
 - Connection length, conditional on > 0 2034 2.661 2.992 0.047 77
Number of connections (WAP_COUNT) 8504 1.131 4.568 0 118
Price per minute (WAP_PMIN, euro / min)
 - Wireless plan "A" 7280 0.120 0 0.12 0.12
 - Wireless plan "B" 1224 0.170 0 0.17 0.17
Fixed per-connection fee (WAP_K, euros) 8504 0.090 0 0.09 0.09
Experiment-periods 3-5 Obs: N*3 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Connection duration (CALL_DUR)
 - Prop. of customers with # of connections > 0 6378 0.797 0.402 0 1
 - Connection length, conditional on > 0 5086 5.542 4.729 0.067 64
Number of connections (WAP_COUNT) 6378 11.942 22.213 0 325
Price per minute (WAP_PMIN, euro / min)
 - Wireless plan "A" 5460 0 0 0 0
 - Wireless plan "B" 918 0 0 0 0
Fixed per-connection fee (WAP_K, euros) 6378 0 0 0 0
Consumer characteristics Obs: N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age (AGE, in years) 2126 36.45 12.41 18 86
Gender (GENDER, Male = 1) 2126 0.72 0.45 0 1
Location (CITY, Helsinki area = 1) 2126 0.23 0.42 0 1
Subscription plan  (SUBTYPE, "A" = 1) 2126 0.86 0.31 0 1
Table 2. Structural parameters and economic implications
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Expected number of needs (m)
 - per two-week period 11.539 1.485 11.539 1.485
 - per year 300.015 38.614 300.015 38.614
Prob(connect / need) (p) 0.100 0.042 0.100 0.039
Expected # of connections established (mp)
 - per two-week period 1.128 0.415 1.128 0.371
 - per year 29.325 10.784 29.321 9.650
The price elasticity of:
 - wireless connection length
        w.r.t. per-minute price (p) 2.280 0.534 1.869 0.145
        w.r.t. fixed connection fee (K) - - - -
 - # of wireless connections
        w.r.t. per-minute price (p) 1.590 0.285 4.469 0.922
        w.r.t. fixed connection fee (K) 0.390 0.032 2.367 0.339
Linear demand Log-linear demand
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Table 3. Marginal cost estimates
Marginal cost of Linear Log-linear Aver. 1* Aver. 2** Med. 1* Med. 2** Std.err.*
  - Establishing connection, C 0.029 0.074 0.015 0.022 0.010 0.013 0.019
       Prob[C > Model C]*** 0.236 0.001 - - - - -
  - Lengthening connection by 1 min., c 0.067 0.080 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.012
       Prob[c > Model c]*** <0.001 <0.001 - - - - -
* based on point estimates (survey data)
** based on distribution estimates (survey data)
*** assuming normality and using the standard error reported in the last column
Model Expert opinion (survey data)
Table 4. Counterfactual experiments
Connection
probability
(p)
Average
connection
length (min)
Producer
surplus
(euro)
Consumer
surplus
(euro)
Linear model
     Actual prices (p = 0.12, K = 0.09) 0.10 6.92 17.05 16.40
     Optimal prices (p = 0.09, K = 0.02) 0.16 5.62 17.99 21.02
     No connection fee (p = 0.096, K = 0) 0.22 3.89 17.64 20.63
     Marginal cost pricing (p = c, K = C) 0.48 5.53 0.00 61.33
Log-linear model
     Actual prices (p = 0.12, K = 0.09) 0.06 2.31 4.12 1.09
     Optimal prices (p = 0.055, K = 0.046) 0.45 2.43 14.96 13.58
     No connection fee (p = 0.085, K = 0) 1.00 0.67 8.02 12.92
     Marginal cost pricing (p = c, K = C) 0.83 3.15 0.00 43.74
Note: c = 0.020, C = 0.022
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Figure 1. Consumption needs and the conditional connection probability
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APPENDIX
A. Monopoly assumption and FOCs
Monopoly assumption: The operator whose data we use had a considerable degree of monopoly
power over the first (actual and potential) users of the mobile internet services.37 The primary
reason for this is that most of the potential users were captive. There are four pieces of evidence
supporting this claim: First, the consumers had subscribed to a wireless-voice plan before the new
mobile services were available. This means that once available, the new service was a kind of add-
on and consumed within the plan, i.e., conditional on being a subscriber to the particular voice-
dominated service bundle. As we will argue, the pricing of the add-on (i.e., the new service within
the bundle) was at the discretion of the operator. Second, over the period our data is from, the
voice and earlier non-voice (e.g., text messaging) parts of the bill were clearly larger than that
emanating from the use of mobile internet services. We therefore think it unlikely that a different
price for the new mobile Internet services would have lead customers to switch operators and by
implication, that there was any significant price competition in the dimension of the operator’s
offering we focus on. Third, even if a consumer wanted to switch, there was a considerable non-
pecuniary hurdle: The cellular phone numbers were not portable at the time. According to survey
evidence reported by the Finnish Ministry of Transports and Communications, portability was the
most important obstacle to switching (see also Viard 2006). The statistics on the number of con-
sumers who have switched after portability was implemented in June 2003 unambiguously support
this survey evidence. Finally, assuming monopoly pricing will give us a lower bound estimate of
marginal costs. Our prior is that prices were too high, implying that monopoly assumption works
against our prior. The results confirm ex post that the monopoly assumption is reasonable in the
sense of us finding that the actual prices were higher than static optimal monopoly prices. That is,
the estimated optimal monopoly prices from our preferred model are lower than the actual prices
that were charged. This revealed pricing behavior strongly suggests that the operator whose data
37 To be sure, it was not strictly speaking a formal monopoly. The operator was over the time pe-
riod we study one of the two dominant players in the Finnish mobile telecommunications market.
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we have did not behave as if it faced significant price competition over the users of the early mo-
bile services.38
Optimal two-part tariff and first-order conditions (FOCs): Ignoring consumer heterogene-
ity for brevity, the optimal two-part tariff solves
(A.1) [ ][ ],max (1 ( ( , ))) ( , )( )p K F p K q p K p c K Ca am a t t t t>W = - - + -
where c = marginal cost per minute of connection, C = marginal cost of opening/terminating a
connection, qa a>  = conditional connection length, and t  = the valued added tax (VAT) parame-
ter (22%), implying that per-minute price (connection fee) charged from the customer is pt ( Kt ).
The above objective function also explicitly allows for the dependence of a  and qa a>  on the
parameters of the tariff.
Let
( , ) (1 ( ( , )))A p K F p Km a t tº - ; and
( , ) ( , )( )B p K q p K p c K Ca a t t>º - + - .
The general form of the FOCs is
(A.2)
( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , ) 0A p K B p KB p K A p K
i i i
¶W ¶ ¶
= + =
¶ ¶ ¶
for i = p, K. For the linear demand function, the parts of the FOCs can be written as:
(A.3) ( , ) exp( ( 2 )A p K p Km l gt gt= - +
(A.4) ( , ) 2 1/ ]( )B p K K p c K Cgt l= + - + -
(A.5) ( , ) (1 ( ( , )))A p K F p K
p
lgtm a t t¶ = - -
¶
38 If and when rivals offer similar products at different prices, changing (raising) prices might lead
some customers to change their operator. The estimated optimal monopoly prices mean, however,
that should our operator have a lower degree of monopoly power than we have assumed, a change
towards the optimal prices should have induced an in-flow of customers (assuming the potential
rivals  would  not  have  changed  their  behavior).  If  rivals  had  matched  the  price  changes,  there
would have been no reason for their customers to change operators. It is therefore unlikely that our
customer-level figures would be greatly affected by such switches. If at all, the effect would most
likely be that our figures present a lower bound. The reason for this is that the most likely custom-
ers to change from a rival operator to the operator whose data we have would have been those with
above average valuation (and hence usage) of mobile internet services.
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(A.6) ( , ) 2 (1/ ) 1/B p K K
p
gt l¶ = +
¶
(A.7) ( , ) (1/ 2) 2 (1/ ) (1 ( ( , )))A p K K F p K
K
gt a t t¶ é ù= - -ë û¶
(A.8) ( , ) (1/ 2) 2 ( ) 1B p K K p c
K
gt¶ = - +
¶
.
For the log- linear demand function, the corresponding parts take the following forms:
(A.9) 2( , ) exp( exp( ))A p K K pm lgt gt= -
(A.10) 2( , ) [( )( exp( ) 1/ ) exp( ) ]B p K p c K p p K Cg t gt l gt= - + - + -
(A.11) [ ]2 3( , ) exp( ) (1 ( ( , )))A p K K p F p K
p
lg t gt m a t t¶ = - -
¶
(A.12) 2( , ) exp( )(1/ )(1 ( )]B p K K p p c
p
g t gt l gt¶ = + - - -
¶
(A.13) [ ]2( , ) exp( ) (1 ( ( , )))A p K p F p K
K
lgt gt m a t t¶ = - -
¶
(A.14) 2( , ) ( ) 1B p K p c
K
gt¶ = - +
¶
.
B. Survey of expert opinions
Design and structure of the survey: In initial discussions with an industry expert it became clear
that the relevant marginal costs are, given the circumstances of WAP introduction (i.e., existing
networks with high coverage, large capacity and therefore no need to install new capac-
ity/expansion of network coverage), the opening/termination cost of an extra WAP (GSM) connec-
tion through the existing network, and the marginal cost of lengthening an existing WAP (GSM)
connection by one more minute. It also turned out that it is most likely the case that the operators
have not systematically gathered and/or stored data on the two marginal costs.
To obtain information on marginal costs, we designed a structured survey that consisted in
total of 13 questions and that was administrated to a number of acknowledged industry experts
(more on this below). The structure of the survey was as follows: First, a definition and example of
marginal costs were given. Second, the respondents were asked point estimates of the two mar-
ginal costs (Q1-Q2). The next two questions were about the marginal costs of GSM calls (Q3-Q4)
and the fifth (Q5) was a statement about the (technical) equivalence of WAP connections and
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GSM calls. We designed Q5 to be a check-question. The purpose was to be able to separate the
answers of those respondents who know that WAP connections were technically identical to GSM
calls from the answers of those who didn’t know this. The sixth question (Q6) was about the elas-
ticity of demand and the seventh (Q7) about pricing. Finally, we elicited through a series of ques-
tions (Q8-Q13) information on the distribution of marginal costs, following the work of Dominitz
and Manski (1996, 1997).39 The survey instrument was pre-tested with an industry expert and
modified slightly on the basis of his reactions to it.
Selection of the survey frame and survey procedure: We asked for names of people likely to
have intimate knowledge of WAP as of 2001 both from an acknowledged industry expert, and
from operators and a large telecom equipment company, yielding us in the end 36 names. We sent
these people an email explaining our survey (with the survey attached) and requested to call them
at their convenience. After a couple of reminder emails we phoned them if we had not received
any reaction. When making the survey-call, we explained them (as described in the survey docu-
ment) the purpose of the study and the survey, and proceeded to ask the questions. We did not
systematically record the length of the interviews, but a typical interview lasted 35-45 minutes.
Response rate and reasons for non-response:  In  the  end,  18  people  agreed to  answer  our
questions, but several of them made various reservations. Those who declined invariably gave as
the main reason that they felt that they did not have adequate expertise to answer our questions
(which they often called difficult). Only one person declined because of corporate policy. We
ended up discarding answers of 5 people because they did not agree at least partly with our techni-
cal background question (Q5 in the survey). Some of those who are included in the final survey
sample made various reservations which we recorded. In order to be conservative, we decided to
keep their answers in the sample as they regularly gave higher estimates of marginal costs than
those respondents not making reservations. By doing this we hope to have avoided any downward
bias in our estimated marginal costs, as downward bias would strengthen our results vis-à-vis
deviations from optimal pricing, and the consequences of this.
C. Estimation results
39 The complete survey document is available at Otto Toivanen’s www-page (www.hecer.fi).
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We present the basic estimation results of the first and second step of the two-step m-estimation
procedure briefly here, because the key insights come from the economic implications of the
model. Table A.1 displays the cross-validation results, separately for exp( ( , ))ig z m
% %
 and
( , )ik z l% %
. The first step estimation results are displayed in Table A.2, which among things shows
that Wald-tests indicate that the included variables are jointly highly significant. The results from
the second step are displayed in Table A.3, separately for linear and log-linear demand. We report
Huber-White standard errors adjusted for clustering within consumers in both tables. Bootstrap-
ping the standard errors in the second step is important, for they are about ten times larger than the
unadjusted (incorrect) standard errors.
[Insert Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 here]
D. Back-of-the-envelope i-mode calculation
Let us start by emphasizing that reliable price comparisons between WAP and i-mode are difficult
due to differences in the pricing principles (i-mode’s package based vs. WAP’s two-part metered
tariff) and especially due to lack of comparable data: From Kakkori (2001) we can infer that in
Spring 2001, the monthly fee for the i-mode service was 2.73 euros. In addition, one packet, i.e.,
128 bytes, cost 0.0027 euros. If a representative WAP connection in our data had involved a trans-
fer of 2 kilobytes, the price of making the connection using i-mode would have been around 0.042
euros. Comparing the i-mode price to the prices used and obtained in our counterfactual calcula-
tions show that usage would have been higher than it actually was. If one took into account differ-
ences in service quality (see the main text), the increase in usage would correspondingly be larger.
E. Further robustness checks: Learning, consumption shifting and advertising
In Table A.4 we report reduced form estimations of Poisson models of connection counts, and
within estimates of connection length, conditioning naturally on strictly positive connection
length. Both specifications include consumer fixed effects and period fixed effects with period 1 as
the base period. As can be seen from the table, the number of connections in one of the two post-
experiment  periods  was  smaller  than  in  period  1  (the  base  period),  and  larger  in  the  other.  Al-
though this doesn’t strictly rule out experimentation, it does suggest that the consumers did not
update their beliefs regarding the quality of their goods. This, coupled with the fact that the num-
ber of connections remains high through all three experiment periods suggests that learning or
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experimentation is not a culprit: If it were the case that consumers initially experimented, they
should have rather quickly have realized that their priors hold, in which case the demand during
the later parts of the experiment (period 5) should already mostly reflect “true” demand. The de-
mands during the three experimental periods, while decreasing in time, are rather close to each
other. While re-estimation of the model using only period 5 (i.e., excluding data from the first two
experiment periods 3 and 4) data produces lower elasticities and higher consumer surpluses, the
overall picture remains the same. E.g. using the linear model, the mean connection length price
elasticity is 1.97 compared to 2.28, and the mean annual consumer surplus 21.89 compared to
16.40 when we do not utilize the (experiment) periods 3 and 4 in estimation.
[Insert Table A.4 here]
As to shifting consumption into the experiment period, the results do not support that alter-
native either as the coefficients of both the last pre-experiment and the first post-experiment peri-
ods are positive, indicating higher usage than during the base period (period 1). Finally, as the
post-experiment number and length of connections is not systematically higher than in the pre-
experiment periods, there is no evidence that advertising resulted in a shift in demand.
We repeated this analysis using a sample of individuals who early on reacted strongly to the
pricing experiment. The reasoning is that if some individuals only learned of the experiment in the
2nd or  3rd two-week period, they might not have had enough time to experiment/learn. We thus
computed for each customer the change in number of connections from the last pre-experiment to
the 1st experiment period, and excluded all individuals who were below the mean (in the second
variant, median) change. We then reran the reduced form fixed effects Poisson and length of call
estimations including only the last experiment period and all the non-experiment periods in the
estimation sample. The results, available upon request, are very similar to those reported above.
F. Results using data from plan “B” consumers
We repeat our empirical analysis using the data on the plan “B” subscribers. For brevity, we only
note that cross-validation results suggest that the simplest model (Model 1 in Table A.2) suffices.
The estimated latent demand remains strong and price elasticities high: The average number of
needs per consumer is 14.36 per a two-week period. The average per-minute price (pt) elasticity of
connection length ranges from -2.04 (log-linear demand) to -2.91 (linear demand). We also obtain
large price elasticities of the number of wireless connections for the per-minute price and the fixed
fee. For example, the per-minute price elasticity of the number of wireless connections is on aver-
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age -1.78, and ranges from -0.82 to -3.20 for the linear demand. However the conditional probabil-
ity of opening a connection is (again) small, on average about 9%. When translated into annual
numbers, the per consumer surplus is on average 18.33 euros in the case of linear demand and 1.54
euros in the case of log-linear demand. These results are in line with the results we obtained using
the data on the more popular plan.
G. Reduced form (consumer surplus) estimates
In our case, the relevant consumer surplus/CV -measure is the difference in the consumer’s expen-
diture function between the expenditure at the market prices and at the service’s virtual price,
which is the price that sets the service’s demand to zero. These expenditures are measured at the
level of the utility received once the new service is on the market. Hausman (1999) shows that a
practical way to compute the welfare gain is to use the approximation 10.5CV pYe -» - , where Y is the
quantity consumed, p is the price, and e  is the own-price elasticity. In our case, direct application
of the above approach is complicated for three reasons. First, what is Y? Second, what is p? Third,
what functional form should we use to estimate e ? The standard log-log linear form is an option,
but it cannot in our case be linearized conveniently by taking logarithms, because Y is frequently
zero, as is the price during the experiment periods.
We proceed by assuming that Y is the number of connections made. To define p we com-
pute the average of connection lengths over all consumer-period observations for which the length
is positive, using data from the non-experiment periods only. We then take as the imputed price
per connection the sum of the fixed connection fee plus the average outlay per connections, de-
fined as the product of the per-minute charge and the average connection length. This imputed
total price is 0.42 euros per connection. We then regress the number of connections on the imputed
total price using a standard Poisson regression. Table A.5 reports the own-price elasticity and
consumer surplus estimates derived from the reduced form regression that we report in the main
body of the text. It also gives the underlying regression coefficients.
[Insert Table A.5. here]
With this benchmark reduced form estimate at hand, we perform a number of additional
reduced-form estimations: First, we replicate the results of Table A.5 by estimating a standard
linear model with ordinary least squares. The coefficient of the price variable is -115.70, which
results in even lower consumer surplus. Second, we use a different imputed per connection price:
If we simply take the “total” price to be the fixed connection fee, which is 0.09 euros, plus the per-
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minute price, which in the more popular plan is 0.12 euros, we obtain an elasticity estimate that is
clearly lower, about one fifth of that presented in Table A.5. The estimated consumer surpluses
remain, however, negligible at 1.31 euros per consumer per annum. Finally, we allow for con-
sumer heterogeneity: Estimating a fixed-effects Poisson (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984)
reinforces the finding of highly elastic demand: At the imputed total price of 0.42 euros per con-
nection, the own-price elasticity is -10.83. Using the demographic variables as an alternative way
to control for the heterogeneity produces very similar results. Taken together, these alternative
welfare calculations echo the findings reported in the main text.
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Table A.1. Cross-validation results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CONSTANT X X X X X X
AGE X X X X X X
GENDER X X X X X X
CITY X X X X X X
GENDER*AGE X X X X X
CITY*AGE X X X X X
GENDER*CITY X X X X X
AGE^2 X X X X
GENDER*AGE^2 X X X
CITY*AGE^2 X X X
AGE^3 X X
GENDER*AGE^3 X
CITY*AGE^3 X
Cross-validation
  of exp(g(.)) 2588.502 2585.69 2588.231 2590.941 2591.215 2601.392
  of k(.) 110.1632 110.1178 110.0678 110.0267 109.8905 110.023
Table A.2. Estimation results from the first step (m and l)
Coefficient Std. error* Coefficient Std. error*
AGE 0.010 0.006 -0.069 0.036
GENDER 0.112 0.291 -0.051 0.325
CITY 0.404 0.268 -0.609 0.313
GENDER*AGE -3.8E-03 6.5E-03 -7.3E-03 1.6E-02
CITY*AGE -0.017 0.006 0.025 0.017
GENDER*CITY 0.046 0.161 -0.028 0.077
AGE2 - - 1.5E-03 7.9E-04
GENDER*AGE2 - - 1.7E-04 2.0E-04
CITY*AGE2 - - -3.1E-04 2.2E-04
AGE3 - - -1.1E-05 5.4E-06
CONSTANT 2.133 0.277 2.814 0.522
Obs. 5460 4350
Wald (joint significance) 36.91 67.61
  d.f. 6 10
  p-value 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood -66434.57 -5555.11
*Huber-White heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrix, adjusted for
clustering within consumers
WAP_COUNT (m) CALL_DUR (l)
Table A.3. Estimation results from the second step (?)
Model Linear demand Log-linear demand
Coefficient Std. error* Std. error** Coefficient Std. error* Std. error**
AGE -1.083 0.035 0.381 -0.096 0.004 0.037
GENDER -41.497 2.073 17.329 -3.796 0.197 1.487
CITY -5.828 2.398 19.944 -0.912 0.220 1.759
GENDER*AGE 0.965 0.043 0.412 0.090 0.005 0.039
CITY*AGE -0.263 0.043 0.379 -0.032 0.005 0.040
GENDER*CITY -8.206 1.354 11.469 -0.296 0.146 1.077
CONSTANT 102.003 1.825 16.204 20.068 0.178 1.409
Obs. 12740 12740
Log-likelihood -85963.512 -86007.262
*unadjusted standard error
**bootstrap standard error
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Table A.4. Reduced form estimation of connection count and call length (cond. > 0)
Period-dummy Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
t = 2 0.277 < 0.001 0.142 0.593
t = 3 2.652 < 0.001 2.783 < 0.001
t = 4 2.341 < 0.001 2.653 < 0.001
t = 5 2.25 < 0.001 2.436 < 0.001
t = 6 0.166 0.001 -0.411 0.119
t = 7 -0.085 0.011 0.139 0.606
Consumer fixed-
effects
2 vs. 6
2 vs. 7
6 vs. 7
Tests of equality of period coefficients (p-values)
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.028
0.992
0.025
LengthCount
YESYES
Table A.5. Reduced form Poisson estimation and consumer surplus
Own-price elasticity Annual per-consumer surplus (euros)
At the imputed price: -10.84 0.56
Price-variable Constant
Coefficient -25.89 10.95
Standard error 0.85 0.29
